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Two principles distinguish experimental economic science from other experimental
social sciences. First, we experimental economists pay our participants based upon the
decisions they make. Incentives matter. Not only might it seem hypocritical not to practice
what we preach, but we are also concerned that the experiment’s rewards are salient and
achieve dominance. Smith (1982b, pp. 931, 934) explains:
In order that subject rewards in a laboratory experiment have motivational relevance such
rewards must be associated indirectly with the message actions of subjects. This is called
Saliency: Individuals are guaranteed the right to claim a reward which is increasing (decreasing)
in the goods (bads) outcomes…of an experiment…
A condition sufficient to guarantee that we have not lost control over preferences…[is called]
Dominance: The reward structure dominates any subjective costs (or values) associated with
participation in the activities of an experiment.

Note the subtle ethical imperatives: “must be,” “guarantee,” and “the right to claim.” The
integrity of our experimental conclusions rests on the soundness of our methods. A casual
perusal of experimental papers reveals that the average salient earnings in economic
experiments, i.e., excluding any payment for showing up on‐time, range roughly from US$10 for
an hour long session to US$40 for a two‐hour long session.
Secondly, we do not use deception, not out of any deontic aversion to dishonesty, but
rather because we are “concerned about developing and maintaining a reputation among the
student population for honesty in order to ensure that subject actions are motivated by the
induced monetary rewards rather than by psychological reactions to suspected manipulation”
(Davis and Holt, 1993, pp. 23‐24).1 Again, our concern is for the integrity of the inferences from
our observations.
While there is apparent wide agreement on what it means to maintain salience and
achieve dominance of rewards, the same is not true of deception. Hertwig and Ortmann (2008)
open their answer to the question of What is deception? by uncontentiously positing that
“[d]eception is not easily defined” (p. 61). Krawczyk (2013) conducts a survey of experimental
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economists and confirms that there is no clear agreement in practice on what deception is. My
goal in this chapter is to shine a little light on the subject.
Is ‘What is Deception?’ a Perspicuous Question?
Like ordinary people, economists are serial nominalizers. If people do not sign up for
retirement plans, it is because of hyperbolic discounting; if someone bids aggressively in a first‐
price auction, it is because of risk aversion; if proposers offer more than the minimum
increment in an ultimatum game, it is because of fairness; etc., etc. So it is not surprising that
when it comes to the ethics of experimental economists, we pose the question as about
deception, the noun.2
Perhaps the form of the question befuddles us. As Wittgenstein (1958) recognized, “the
mistake we are liable to make [is]…that we are looking for a ‘thing corresponding to a
substantive’” (p. 5). A thing is something we classify by its boundaries, its features. Is this pest
a termite or an ant alate? Well, let’s look at the wings, antennae, and waist. Is this procedure
deception by commission or omission? Well, let’s look at the experimenter’s behavior and/or
the participants’ perceptions of the experiment (Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002; Hertwig and
Ortmann, 2008). But deception isn’t a thing like a household pest is a thing; it’s a
conceptualization of what we do and so it doesn’t have boundaries that make it readily
identifiable. I know I have a termite problem and not an ant problem if the specimen on the
floor has fore and hind wings of equal size, beaded antennae, and a broad waist. In contrast,
we cannot envision all the forms of deception that we may encounter because there is no finite
set of characteristics by which to classify it.
That doesn’t deter us from trying to categorize the features of deception. Ortmann and
Hertwig (2002) propose a boundary with the imperative that “default assumptions should be
avoided” (p. 113). They explain by example what a default assumption is: “One default
assumption participants may reasonably have is that the initial interaction with the
experimenter (upon entering the laboratory) is not yet part of the experiment” (p. 113). The
difficulty with creating this boundary, as they mention in an endnote, is (p. 126):
Admittedly, this statement is difficult to operationalize. In the words of one referee, “How will
we know what range of default assumptions might be entertained by a given sample pool.” One
sensible approach to assessing default assumptions would be appropriately constructed pilot
sessions.
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Invoking appropriateness does not take us far, for it adds yet another unclear feature as to
what deception is.
In his survey of experimental economists, Krawczyk (2013) makes the distinction
between instructional statements to participants that “may be likely to change at least some
subjects’ behavior” and those that convey “complete information” (p. 3). Ortmann and
Hertwig’s referee would ask, “How will we know what complete information is and what would
change some subjects’ behavior?” Complete information amounts in practice to what
economists themselves need to know in order to solve the mathematical representation of a
problem presented to experimental participants. Not only is this odd—delimiting the meaning
of dishonesty by the current reach of positive economic analysis—but it also rules out as honest
inquiry questions not deducible from economic theory. As we shall see, there are many
questions regarding changes in participant behavior that are not covered by complete
knowledge. Must an experimenter be deemed dishonest by a charge of deception to explore
them?
No, but we do avoid pinning a scarlet D on an experimenter by posing the question as
What is deception?. Listen to the tone of questioners in seminars and conferences and watch
the body language of the presenter. To question a procedural detail as deceptive comes rather
close to calling into question the ethical character of a person, and in everyday conversations
that carries strong emotional force. Posing the question as Is that not deception? softens the
charge and puts the focus on the procedural detail, not the experimenter and his or her moral
character. But here’s the rub. The experimenter is responsible for each and every detail of the
experiment. The experimenter did what he or she did for a reason, to answer a specific
question. It is the experimenter of whom we can ask questions and inquire about what is in
fact the case or not the case. So rather than work with the nominalization of the problem, let’s
let the action of a verb do the work and pose the question like we generally do for ethical
infractions: Who did what to whom?
Did the Experimenter Deceive the Participants?
Notice how this question differs from What is deception?. We are not trying to settle
what deception is by covering all the positively creative ways that we can construct an
experiment. We are asking a question of a specific case, of something that has happened, of
what someone did, and the answer to this question rests on the meaning of the word deceive. I
propose that we use pithy definition #1 from Dictionary.com: to mislead by a false appearance
or statement.
Two elements must be established with this definition to attaint an experimenter as
having done something to deceive a participant. First, the experimenter must have wrongly led
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or wrongly guided. Whatever assistance the experimenter gave the participants to make
decisions, some component of what the experimenter did must have been wrong. Secondly, as
in a court of (common) law, establishing wrongness of actions consists in assessing evidence
with reference to objective criteria. What criteria might these be? A false appearance or a false
statement.
Consider the case of Ortmann and Hertwig’s default assumption. Instead of posing the
question in terms of the default assumptions of the participants, let’s examine the
experimenter’s action with the following yes‐or‐no questions directed to the experimenter.
Questioner:

As the participants entered the laboratory, did you collect data as a part
of this experiment?
Experimenter: Yes.
Questioner: Do you collect data as part of every other experiment of yours as
participants enter the laboratory?
Experimenter: No.
Questioner: That seems peculiar and difficult to reconcile as a genuine appearance.
Why did you choose as part of this experiment to collect data as the
participants enter the laboratory?
At this point, like in all research, we must rely on the integrity of the experimenter. In the
subsequent sections I consider several economic experiments and answer the question, did the
experimenters mislead the participants by false appearance or statement?
Kim and Walker (1984)
Let’s start with a straightforward case. In this public goods experiment with voluntary
contributions Kim and Walker instruct their participants that “[t]here are exactly 100 people
involved in this experiment, including yourself” (p. 16). They disclose to the reader, however,
that “[w]e did not in fact use 100 subjects in the experiment…Instead, we used only five
subjects” (p. 19). By their own admission Kim and Walker misled their participants by false
statement.
Burnham, McCabe, and Smith (2000)
Krawczyk (2013) includes this experiment as an example of “deception by omission” for
the use of a “surprise continuation” of the session. In Burnham, McCabe, and Smith’s words,
though, “[t]here was no deception. Subjects were given the instructions for Single play [of an
extensive form trust game] with no mention of whether there would be other experiments.
After Single play, subject were paid and told that today they would be part of a second
experiment” (p. 64). Burnham, McCabe, and Smith instructed their participants on how to play
their trust game and how their decisions mapped into cash payoffs. After the participants
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made their decisions, the experimenters paid the participants as they said they would. Then
they told the volunteers that they could participate in a second experiment.
A false statement about the second experiment would be informing the participants
upfront that there would be one and only one play of an extensive form trust game and then
springing the surprise second experiment on them. Burnham, McCabe, and Smith made no
such false statement, but is the surprise second experiment a false appearance? At first blush
this case reminds us of Ortmann and Hertwig’s default assumption. Is the surprise continuation
part of this experiment? Yes. Is the surprise continuation part of every other experiment of
yours? No. But these answers don’t appear as peculiar in tandem. Why? Because entering the
laboratory in the Ortmann and Hertwig example is a necessary part of conducting an
experiment in a laboratory. It appears in every experiment and so guiding participants to their
seats as if it does not matter constitutes a false appearance—not unlike treating a confederate
as if he or she is not a confederate is a false appearance.3 The key, I argue, is what did the
experimenters do and the appearance thereof. The experimenters collected data as the
participants entered the laboratory. In other experiments they do not do this. The appearance
is the same in both cases but former’s appearance is a false one because as they collected data
they appeared not to be doing something when in fact they were.
A surprise second experiment is not necessary for a project, so what would the
experimenters do if they didn’t conduct a surprise second experiment? Exactly the same thing
as when they conducted the first experiment plus a surprise second experiment, just without
the second experiment. There was no false appearance that there was only one experiment
when in fact there was a second experiment. Nor was there a false appearance to the second
experiment. The second experiment simply appeared. The surprise continuation does not
constitute leading the participants because there is nothing to lead the participants to. That
the experimenters knew something at the start of the experiment that the participants did not
is not a matter of the experimenters doing anything to mislead the participants by false
appearance or statement.4
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Holt and Laury (2002)
This well‐cited article for measuring risk aversion pushes the boundaries of the previous
case. Here is what they said to the participants in what they called the “Option A/B” choice:5
You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used
in the end to determine your earnings...After you have made all of your choices, we will throw
this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine
what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even
though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but
you will not know in advance which decision will be used.

The second throw of the die is the realization of the lottery that has been randomly selected for
payoff. After all decisions have been made, the experimenters passed out another page of
instructions. This is the first paragraph of the second set of instructions:
Now, we will provide you with the chance to make another choice, with much higher potential
payoffs, as you can see from the sheet we are passing around. As always, we will pay you the
exact amount you earn in this part, and we have the cash required. If you choose to participate in
this round, we will not pay you what you just earned in the Option A/B choice that you just
finished, i.e. you can choose which one you want to count, and to be added to your earnings
from all previous parts. The procedures are exactly as before, after you make your ten decisions,
we throw the die once to determine which decision is to be used, and then we throw the die to
determine the payoff for that decision.

Unlike Burnham, McCabe and Smith, Holt and Laury did not complete the first
experiment. They wished to avoid having the realized wealth from the first lottery affect the
choices in the second lottery with much higher stakes. Did Holt and Laury mislead their
participants by false statement? Holt and Laury said that they “will throw this die twice” for the
first experiment, but they never did because all of the participants chose to forego their first
experiment earnings. They also said that “only one of these [Option A/B decisions] will end up
affecting your earnings.” If we were to ask Holt and Laury what they would have done had a
participant elected not to participate in the second experiment, we would have to take them at
their word if they said that they would have executed the first experiment lottery and
subsequently dismissed the participant. At some point with these questions we reach bedrock
and can’t avoid relying on the integrity of the scholars, and this makes it difficult to conclude
that Holt and Laury misled their participants by false statement.
Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe (2007)
In 1997, “a good decade between first sessions and eventual publication,”
Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, McCabe, and Holly Ameden were interested in how the
deceptive. Not all digits are thumbs. Let’s be precise about the everyday meaning of deceive and its application to
experimental economic science.
5
Accessed at http://people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/highdata.pdf on February 15, 2014.
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disappointment of expectations in the early rounds of a public goods experiment contributed to
the standard decay of voluntary contributions (see, e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988).6 The stylized
facts of the voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods is that some people start the
experiment contributing all of their tokens to the “Group Account,” others contribute none,
and some others hedge splitting their tokens between the Group and Private Accounts. Over
time, however, the full contributors stop fully contributing and the hedgers stop hedging. What
if, Gunnthorsdottir et al. surmised, the full contributors met other full contributors in the first
period, would their contributions still decay over time?7
Since full contributors aren’t identifiable ex ante by a mark on their foreheads, they
designed a procedure by which a pool of participants would first decide their contributions and
then the software would allocate the individuals to proper subsets of four‐person public goods.
In the baseline condition the software randomly assigned participants to different subgroups of
four people. In the other condition, the software assigned the four highest contributors to one
group of four, the next four highest contributors to another group, and so on. To hold constant
the expectations of whom the participants may be meeting, the experimenters did not inform
the participants in either treatment on how they were being matched. Here are their exact
instructions for both conditions:8
Each period proceeds as follows:
First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the public account,
respectively. Use the mouse to…
Second, once everyone has submitted his or her investment decision, you will be assigned to a
group with 4 members (including yourself). Your total group investment will then be determined
and your experimental earnings calculated.
Third, you will receive a message with your experimental earnings for the period. This
information will also appear in your Record Sheet.
A new period will begin after everyone has acknowledged his or her earnings message.
After the last period, you will receive a message with your total experimental earnings (sum of
earnings in each period).

Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith (2007) applied a similar procedure to a two‐person
extensive form trust game. In the baseline condition, first movers were randomly matched
with second movers. In the sorting condition, more trustworthy second movers were matched
with more trusting first movers. Their instructions for both conditions state that “[t]he joint
decisions made by you and your counterpart for that period will determine how much money
6

Daniel Houser (personal communication, February 18, 2014).
Their answer is no, they sustain high contributions without decay.
8
I received a copy of the instructions by contacting the first author.
7
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you will earn in that period. After each period you will be re‐paired.”9 My co‐authors and I
adopted a similar one‐time matching mechanism in Wilson, Jaworski, Schurter, and Smyth
(2012). Our instructions said nothing about how the participants were matched (and not one of
144 participants at two different universities ever asked).10 For the first 13 periods only two
avatars appeared on each of the twelve participant screens, and in period 14 two pairs joined
them out of nowhere to form a sextet.
Not once in the instructions of these three experiments did the authors mislead the
participants. The experimenters created an exercise in which they simply did not inform the
participants on how the pairs or groups were formed. A false statement in these experiments
would be explicitly telling the participants that the experimenters randomly formed the groups
when in actuality they sorted according to the participants’ actions. In all three experiments
the task was what it was; there were no false appearances or false statements.
And yet something about this bothers many economists.11—This must be deception by
omission because had the participants known about the matching algorithm, they would have
acted differently.—Yes, if the authors had informed the participants of the matching
mechanism, this knowledge would have likely changed their decisions, but that is beside the
point and misses the point. These authors are not interested in how people behave when they
know how they are being matched. What people do knowing how they are matched is a
different and, I submit, a less interesting question than what people do when they have no idea
of how they are matched.
The unexamined assumption for claiming deception in these experiments is that
because the experimenter knows something that the subject does not, that somehow the
experimenter is lying to the subjects. Experimenters know a lot about their participants’ tasks
that their participants do not: what the Nash equilibrium is, how the last session performed,
why this is an interesting question, etc. Participants in the canonical double auction
experiment, for example, are typically not told what all the values and costs are. In fact, the
point of that experiment is to demonstrate that the participants can realize nearly 100% of the
gains from trade even without knowledge of the supply and demand arrays (Smith, 1982a). Not
9

Available in a working paper dated February 15, 2006.
Answering this question in the other two designs requires a stoic response. Having conducted the sorting trust
game version probably a hundred times in workshops and courses, inevitably a student will ask, “How are we
matched?” Or, “Are we matched randomly?” My reply is to simply reread the relevant sentences from the
instructions.
11
One referee for Wilson, Jaworski, Schurter, and Smyth (2012) expressed his or her concern thusly: “A more
pertinent issue would seem to concern whether or not telling subjects how their groups are formed is a deceptive
practice or at least something that spells long run loss of control. It seems to me what is done is OK, but perhaps
questionable. There is this design feature subjects are not told about but which if they knew about it would
possibly have changed their behavior in the early stages.”
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telling the participants about all the costs and values, moreover, is not a “loss of control” in the
experiment. To wit, we experimenters are expressly interested in observing what people do
without that knowledge.12
Not providing information in and of itself is insufficient grounds to conclude that the
experimenters have deceived the participants. The nontrivial difference between misleading by
false appearance or statement and simply not providing information in an experiment is a
matter of fact that can be demonstrated to be false. We cannot articulate a general rule on
knowing things (by experimenters or participants) that delineates when experimenters have
deceived their participants and when they have not. We can, however, examine what the
experimenters did in guiding their participants through the experiment and judge the evidence
of those actions as involving a false appearance or false statement. Rather than attempting to
classify experimental procedural details as deception or not, I propose a negative test of
experimenter actions: Did the experimenters mislead the participants by false appearance or
statement?
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